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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, * 
* BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff\Appellee, * 
* 
V. * 
* Case No. 950385-CA 
SANDRA WALKER, * 
* Priority No. 2 
Defendant\Appellant. * 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from a plea of guilty to two counts of 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, within 1,000 feet of a 
church, Second Degree Felonies, and one count of Possession of a 
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, within 1,000 feet 
of a church, a Second Degree Felony, before the Honorable Michael 
J|. Glasmann. The appellant pled guilty to the charges in the 
Second District Court of Weber County on the 25th day of July, 
1995. 
On October 16, 1995, the Appellant was sentenced to serve one 
to fifteen years on each count. These terms were ordered to be 
served concurrently at the Utah State Prison, with credit for time 
served. 
Jurisdiction to hear the above-entitled appeal is conferred 
upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(f) 
(1953 as amended) and Rule 2 6 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW WITH 
Point I Can the Appellant's plea be considered knowing and 
voluntary when the Prosecutor breached the plea agreement by making 
recommendations to the sentencing court when part of the specific 
plea agreement was that the State would remain silent at the 
sentencing phase? 
Standard of Review 
Generally, issues not preserved before the trial court are 
waived and cannot thereafter be raised on appeal. However, Utah's 
appellate courts have evidenced a willingness to hear and rule on 
issues raised for the first time on appeal if the trial court 
committed plain error or the case involved exceptional circumstanc-
es. State v. Cook, 881 P.2d 913, 246 Ut. Adv. Rep. 26 (Ct. App. 
1994) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES 
U.C.A. § 77-13-6 (2) 
(a) a plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only 
upon good cause shown and with leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest 
is made by motion and shall be made within 3 0 days after 
the entry of the plea. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant was originally charged, under two separate case 
numbers, with two counts of Possession of Cocaine with intent to 
distribute, within 1,000 feet of a church, first degree felonies in 
violation of U.C.A. § 58-37-8 (1953 As Amended), Possession of 
Marijuana with intent to distribute, within 1,000 feet of a church, 
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a second degree felony in violation of U.C.A. § 58-37-8 (1953 As 
Amended), and one count of Possession of Marijuana within 1,000 
feet of a church, a Class A Misdemeanor in violation of U.C.A. § 
58-37-8 (1953 As Amended). The Appellant pled not guilty at her 
initial arraignment. Prior to the settlement of this case, the 
Weber County Attorney's Office uncovered additional charges that 
they intended to file against the Appellant. Based upon the new 
charges, the Appellant entered into a plea bargain with the State. 
Through plea negotiations, it was agreed that the Appellant 
would plead guilty to two counts of Possession of Cocaine within 
1,000 feet of a church, and one count of Possession of Marijuana 
with intent to distribute, within 1,000 feet of a church, all 
Second Degree Felonies. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss 
the Class A misdemeanor charge, dismiss other pending charges, not 
file any other charges they were aware of, and agreed to remain 
silent at the time of sentencing. 
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor specifically 
breached the Plea Agreement when he gave a recommendation to the 
court regarding the sentence of the Appellant. The breach occurred 
more than thirty days after the Appellant gave her plea, therefore, 
the Appellant had no recourse to withdraw her plea. 
The Appellant objected to the prosecution's breach of the plea 
agreement, pro-se, at her sentencing hearing. The trial court 
ignored her objections and sentenced her, despite the State's 
obvious breach of the plea bargain. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Appellant, Sandra Walker, was originally charged, under 
two separate case numbers, with two counts of Possession of Cocaine 
with intent to distribute, within 1,000 feet of a church, first 
degree felonies in violation of U.C.A. § 58-37-8 (1953 As Amended), 
Possession of Marijuana with intent to distribute, within 1,000 
feet of a church, a second degree felony in violation of U.C.A. § 
58-37-8 (1953 As Amended), and one count of Possession of Marijuana 
within 1,000 feet of a church, a Class A Misdemeanor in violation 
of U.C.A. § 58-37-8 (1953 As Amended). 
After the filing of the above charges, the Weber County 
Attorney's Office filed additional charges under another case 
number. The Staite further represented that additional charges may 
be filed against Ms. Walker. (R. 7-10) Due to the new charges, 
Ms. Walker entered into a Plea Agreement where she plead to three 
counts of drug violations, all second degree felonies. In exchange 
for Ms. Walker's plea of guilty to those charges, the State agreed 
not to file any other charges they were aware of and they agreed to 
remain silent at the sentencing hearing. (R. 20, 24) 
In accordance with the plea agreement, Ms. Walker pled guilty 
to two counts of Possession of Cocaine within 1,000 feet of a 
church, and one count of Possession of Marijuana with Intent to 
Distribute within 1,000 feet of a church. (R. 19-20) On October 
16, 1995, more than thirty days after the trial court accepted the 
plea of guilty, a sentencing hearing was held before the trial 
court. During the course of the sentencing, Mr. Saunders, a 
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representative of the Weber County Attorney's Office, made specific 
recommendations to the trial court, in direct violation of the plea 
agreement. (R. 3 0-31) 
Ms. Walker immediately advised the trial court that part of 
the plea agreement was that the State would remain silent at 
sentencing. (R. 31) However, the trial court ignored Ms. Walker's 
objection without making findings for the record as to whether the 
agreement was breached. After hearing the State's recommendations, 
the trial court sentenced Ms. Walker to serve three concurrent 
terms of one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison. (R. 31-32) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State failed to keep their part of the plea agreement when 
the prosecuting attorney made recommendations at Ms. Walker's 
sentencing. The State prevented Ms. Walker from making a knowing 
and voluntary plea. Ms. Walker did not make a motion to withdraw 
her pleas, nor could she have done so legally. However, she 
notified the trial court of the breach as soon as it occurred. 
The breach did not occur until after the thirty day time 
period provided for in U.C.A. § 77-13-6, had run. Therefore, there 
was no legal way for Ms. Walker to foresee the breach. This case 
should be remanded back to the trial court to allow Ms. Walker to 
withdraw her pleas, or in the alternative to have a new sentencing, 
in front of a neutral judge, where the State will comply with their 
terms of the plea agreement. 
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ARGUMENT 
The Appellant Could Not Make A Knowing 
And Voluntary Plea When The Prosecution 
Breached The Plea Agreement After 
The Plea Had Been Taken By The Court 
The issue of whether or not Ms. Walker made a knowing plea was 
not raised in the trial court and normally will not be heard by an 
Appellate court. However, this Court has held that: 
Generally, issues not raised before the trial court are 
waived and cannot thereafter be raised on appeal. 
However, Utah's appellate courts have evidenced a 
willingness to hear and rule on issues raised for the 
first time on appeal if the trial court committed plain 
error or the case involved exceptional circumstances. 
State v. Cook, 881 P.2d 913, 246 Ut. Adv. Rep. 26 (Ct. App. 
1994) (citations omitted) 
It is Ms. Walker's contention that plain error and exceptional 
circumstances exist in this case which warrant this Court's review. 
In the case at bar, the issue of the State's violation of the plea 
agreement was raised pro-se by Ms. Walker in the trial court. 
However the tricil court ignored Ms. Walker's objections. Also, the 
time period for a withdrawal of a plea had expired prior to the 
State's breach and she was not given an opportunity to withdraw her 
plea. 
U.C.A. § 77-13-6(2) governs the withdrawal of guilty pleas. 
It states: 
(a) a plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only 
upon good cause shown and with leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest 
is made by motion and shall be made within 30 days after 
the entry of the plea, (emphasis added) 
The State's breach of the plea agreement was not made until 
after the thirty day time period to withdraw a guilty plea had 
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expired. At the time of the breach, Ms. Walker made the trial 
court aware of the breach. The trial court should have immediately 
confirmed the State's breach, and recused itself. Instead the 
court continued with the sentencing, committing plain error. 
Therefore, even absent a formal objection in the trial court, this 
Court should decide the case on its merits for bothplain error and 
exigent circumstances. 
Ms. Walker relied upon the State's promise to remain silent 
during her sentencing. The agreement for the State's silence was 
bargained for prior to the acceptance of the agreement. Had Ms. 
Walker known that the State would renig on their part of the 
bargain, she would not have made the plea. (R. 31) 
Ms. Walker entered a plea pursuant to North Carolina v. 
Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160(1970) on the charges of Posses-
sion of Controlled Substances in order to avoid a heavier penalty 
if she were convicted of the more serious charge of Possession with 
Intent to Distribute. (R. 15) When the State violated the plea 
agreement, Ms. Walker specifically stated that she would not have 
agreed to the plea agreement had the State not agreed to remain 
silent at sentencing. (R. 31) 
The United States Supreme Court has examined the effect of a 
breach of a plea agreement by a prosecutor, and has ruled: "[A] 
constant factor is that when a plea rests in any significant degree 
on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said 
to be part of the inducement or consideration, such a promise must 
be fulfilled." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, (1971). The 
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fact situation in Santobello is very similar to the facts in this 
case. The prosecution in Santobello promised not to make any 
recommendation concerning the defendant's sentence in return for 
the defendant's guilty plea to a lesser charge. 
The Utah Supreme Court followed the rationale of Santobello 
when it held that "[D]efendant pled with an exaggerated belief in 
the benefits of his plea," and "[s]ince defendant surrendered his 
right to trial in apparent misapprehension of the value of 
commitments made to him, he should be allowed to withdraw his 
plea." See State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (1988). 
There is no doubt that a breach occurred in the plea agree-
ment. The record clearly reflects that the State agreed to remain 
silent at the sentencing hearing. The following exchange occurred 
on August 31, 1995: 
THE COURT: State want to be heard? 
MS. SJOGREN: (Prosecuting Attorney) Your Honor, I'm 
looking for notes in my file, and I -- It 
seems to me like I recall that we may have 
agree[d] to remain silent on sentencing on 
this. 
MR. CAINE: (Defense Attorney) That's the plea bargain, 
yes. (R. 24) 
The Court then continued the sentencing to another date to 
allow the Defense a chance to offer alternatives to a prison 
sentence. (R. 25) 
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At the sentencing hearing on October 16, 1995, another 
representative of the Weber County Attorney's Office, Mr. Saunders, 
disregarded the plea agreement when he made a specific recommenda-
tion to the court regarding sentencing. During that hearing the 
following exchange occurred: 
THE COURT: Does the State want to be heard? 
MR. SAUNDERS 
MS. WALKER: 
MR. LAKER: 
MS. WALKER: 
MR. SAUNDERS 
MR. LAKER: 
Yes, Your Honor. Our position is, we've 
always felt like the recommendation for prison 
is appropriate in this case and for the vari-
ous reasons. She's always maintained that she 
just has a use problem. Now we think the 
evidence would -- is in clear dispute with 
that in this case. The State had evidence of 
various buys to this home. When they went to 
the home, the officers went in, the door was 
barred. They had to kick it in. At the time 
that they went in, she was in the process of 
cooking more cocaine at the time that they 
went in. Her -- I guess this was methamphet-
amine. 
Your Honor, this was a drug house. 
People were going there and buying and using 
drugs. We feel like this is a serious prob-
lem. We don't feel like she just has a use 
problem. And for those reasons, we felt like 
the recommendation for prison is appropriate, 
and we don't feel like just putting her in a 
program is going far enough in this case. 
(Appellant) Your Honor, as far as my plea 
bargain, the reason tha[t] I signed it is that 
the State would make no recommendation one way 
or the other on sentencing. That was just 
violated. 
(Defense Attorney) I think that's correct, 
Your Honor. 
I know it's correct. That was part of my plea 
bargain. 
Let me look for a note, Your Honor. There 
wasn't one in my file. Maybe there is one in 
Ms. Sjogren's file. 
The court has the expiation agreement --
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MR. SAUNDERS: I don't have any notes in either file, Your 
Honor. If that's on the expiation agreement, 
I request to see that. 
THE COURT: Would that be something that would be hand-
written? 
MR. LAKER: Yes, Your Honor. May I (unintelligible) might 
be able to find it. 
THE COURT: Mr. Laker, I appreciate you being here. 
This matter has been continued to -- for you 
in particular, and it's obvious to me that 
you've done everything that was requested and 
required of the Court on your behalf. 
The Court is imposing the following 
sentence: I'm sentencing you, Miss Walker, to 
spend one to 15 years in the Utah State Prison 
on the each of these matters. They're to run 
concurrent. I'm placing you in the custody of 
the Weber County Sheriff. I hope, Miss Walk-
er, that some way that the drugs are out of 
your life and you keep them out of your life. 
That's all. 
The statement of the prosecuting attorney was a direct 
violation of the plea agreement reached between the parties. The 
record clearly reflects that Mr. Saunders was unaware of the 
agreement. However, it is not the Appellant's duty to accept the 
ramification of the breach. The mere fact that the breach was 
inadvertent does not lessen it's impact. State v. Garfield, 552 
P.2d 129 (Utah 1976). 
The fact that the State breached it's promise nearly three 
months after Ms. Walker's deadline to withdraw her plea had expired 
literally left Ms. Walker with no recourse to correct the State's 
breach. Ms. Walker immediately brought the breach of the agreement 
to the trial court's attention. However, the court continued the 
sentencing without making a finding as to whether a breach of the 
plea agreement had occurred. (R. 32) 
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A prosecutor may not make promises which induce a guilty plea 
and then refuse to keep those promises. The Utah Supreme Court has 
rejected the position that the State's failure to keep its promise 
would be of no consequence, even when the recommendations are not 
binding upon the court. State v. Copeland, 765 P. 2d 1266, 97 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3 (1988) . In reaching that conclusion, the Utah Supreme 
Court relied upon the well established rule found in Santobello v. 
New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1977) that "when a plea rests in any 
significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so 
that it can be said to be a part of the inducement or consider-
ation, such promise must be fulfilled." Id. at 262 
There is no doubt that Ms. Walker's prime motive in pleading 
guilty was to reduce any sentence she might receive in the 
sentencing phase. She specifically plead to the charges pursuant 
to North Carolina v. Alford. 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160 (1970) in an 
effort to avoid a conviction of the more serious charges. Ms. 
Walker and her trial attorney represented to the court that she 
needed treatment for a drug problem, and that as an alternative to 
prison, the Court should sentence her to intensive treatment in a 
drug rehabilitation facility. The prime objective of Ms. Walker in 
taking the plea was to receive treatment for her drug addiction and 
to avoid prison. j 
The record in this matter clearly demonstrates that Ms. Walker 
relied upon the agreement of the prosecutor to remain silent at the 
sentencing, and this was a primary part of the inducement that 
ultimately led Ms. Walker to enter her Alford pleas. At the time 
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of the breach, Ms. Walker immediately brought the breach to the 
court's attention, and in doing so, stated her reliance upon the 
promise of the State to remain silent. The court had not choice at 
that time. It should have mae an investigation into the State's 
breach and after determining that the breach occurred, recused 
itself. Failure to do so was plain error and must be corrected by 
this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Although Ms. Walker understood that the Court was not bound by 
any recommendations by the prosecutor, those recommendations impact 
the Judge's decision in regards to sentencing. Since Ms. Walker 
relied upon the prosecutor's promise when she entered her plea, any 
breach of that agreement should allow Ms. Walker a chance to 
withdraw her pleas, regardless of the thirty day time provided for 
by statute. 
Wherefore, the Appellant requests that this matter be remanded 
back to the trial court for a hearing on a motion to withdraw her 
pleas. In the alternative, the Appellant requests that this matter 
be remanded to the trial court for re-sentencing before a neutral 
Judge where she can receive the full benefit of the plea agreement. 
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ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
The case law in Utah is silent regarding the withdrawal of a 
guilty plea based upon a breach of a plea agreement after the time 
period for a withdrawal of the plea has expired. The Appellant, 
therefore, respectfully requests that oral argument and a written 
opinion be published in this matter to address the proper procedure 
in this type of situation. This Court needs to publish proper 
guidelines in order to protect the interest of criminal defendants 
and guarantee them the opportunity to make a knowing and voluntary 
plea which gives them the full benefit they bargained for. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J Slav of July^ ) 1996 
^Attorney^for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a two true 
and correct copies of the following Appellant's Brief to the 
following: 
Attorney General's Office 
ATTN: Criminal Appeals 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
DATED this £. day of July, 1996 
6rney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
7 
THE CLERK: IT IS JURY. OKAY. 
THE COURT: NOW, YOU NEED ANOTHER DATE ON THE OTHER 
ONE? 
MR. GRAVIS: WELL, NO. LET'S SET PRETRIAL AND 
DISPOSITION DAY ON THE OTHER ONE. 
THE COURT: DO YOU WANT JULY 6 OR JULY 13? 
MR. GRAVIS: JULY 13TH. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WE'LL SET THE PRETRIAL FOR 
JULY 13TH IN THE MORNING ON ALL -- BOTH CASES, CORRECT? 
DISPOSITION ON THE ONE. 
MR. GRAVIS: YEAH. 
THE COURT: PRETRIAL ON THE OTHER ONE AND WE ONLY 
HAVE ONE TRIAL DATE. 
MR. GRAVIS: THAT'S CORRECT. 
THE COURT: YOU GUYS MAKE THIS VERY CONFUSING. ALL 
RIGHT, MISS WALKER. WE'LL GIVE YOU A SLIP. SEE YOU BACK IN 
COURT ON JULY 13TH. THANK YOU. I PUT IT IN THERE IN PENCIL, 
BUT I DON'T PUT IN ANYTHING BUT THE TRIALS. 
***** 
OGDEN, UTAH JULY 25, 1995 
THE CLERK: STATE OF UTAH VERSUS SANDRA WALKER, 
CASES 9519480, 9519481. (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
MR. LAKER: I THINK WE'RE FINALLY READY ON THIS, 
YOUR HONOR. IT'S BEEN FAIRLY CONFUSING BECAUSE THERE'S 
CHARGES THAT WERE WERE FILED AND NOT GOING TO BE FILED AND 
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THEN WERE FILED AND SO WE'RE JUST -- IT'S TAKEN US A LITTLE 
BIT OF TIME TO BE ABLE TO RESOLVE THIS. BASICALLY --
THE COURT: SO MY UNDERSTANDING, WE HAVE BEFORE US 
CASE 951900480, WHICH CONTAINS TWO COUNTS, ONE A FIRST DEGREE 
FELONY AND A CLASS-A MISDEMEANOR, THEN CASE 951900481, 
CONTAINING A FIRST DEGREE FELONY POSSESSION WITH INTENT AND A 
POSSESSION WITH INTENT, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY. WE HAVE A NEW 
FILING 951002588, WHICH ALLEGES A FIRST DEGREE FELONY WHICH 
THE DEFENDANT HAS NOT BEEN ARRAIGNED ON AS YET. 
MR. LAKER: THAT'S CORRECT. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. LAKER: AND WHAT BASICALLY, SO THAT THE COURT 
KNOWS, IS BASICALLY, SHE IS GOING TO BE ENTERING PLEAS OF 
GUILTY TO THREE SECOND DEGREE FELONY POSSESSION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITHIN A THOUSAND FEET OF A -- OF A 
CHURCH. AND WE'LL BE AMENDING THE INFORMATIONS BY WAY OF 
INTERLINEATION TO BE ABLE TO ACCOMMODATE THAT. AND --
THE COURT: OKAY. NOW, SO THAT --SO THAT I 
UNDERSTAND THEN ON -- THEN ON THE FIRST CASE THAT THE FIRST 
DEGREE FELONY WOULD BE AMENDED TO A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, AND 
SHE WOULD PLEAD TO THAT. AND THEN ON THE SECOND CASE, 481, 
THAT WOULD BE AMENDED TO A SECOND DEGREE FELONY COUNT 1 AND 
SHE WOULD PLEAD TO COUNT 1 AND COUNT 2 --
MS. SJOGREN: WOULD BE DISMISSED. 
MR. LAKER: RIGHT. 
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THE COURT: COUNT 2 IS A SECOND, SO SHE'S GOING TO 
PLEAD TO ONE ON EACH CASE. 
MS. SJOGREN: YOUR HONOR, BECAUSE OF HER PREFERENCE 
NOT TO PLEAD TO A - - ANYTHING THAT HAS WITH INTENT TO 
DISTRIBUTE OR DISTRIBUTION IN THE TITLE OF THE CRIME, WE'RE 
GOING TO THEN AMEND THE THIRD CASE SO THAT THERE ISN'T ANY 
QUESTION. SHE DOESN'T WANT TO PLEAD TO ANYTHING THAT HAS WITH 
INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE. SO THE THIRD CASE WILL BE AMENDED TO A 
SECOND DEGREE FELONY, POSSESSION WITHIN A THOUSAND FEET OF A 
CHURCH AS WELL. 
THE COURT: OKAY. NOW, ARE THERE CLEAN COPIES OF 
THESE? 
MS. SJOGREN: THERE ARE NOT, YOUR HONOR, BECAUSE THEY 
BROUGHT THIS FILE TO ME WHEN I WAS IN JUDGE HEFFERNAN'S COURT. 
THE COURT: THAT'S FINE. 
MS. SJOGREN: AND I DIDN'T REALIZE THAT THEY HADN'T 
BEEN PREPARED. 
THE COURT: THAT'S FINE. OKAY. WHY DON'T YOU --
WHY DON'T YOU THEN, IN CASE NUMBER 951900480, COUNT ONE, THEN 
WILL READ A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, AND HOW WILL THAT READ? 
MS. SJOGREN: SIMPLY POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE WITHIN A THOUSAND FEET OF A CHURCH, SO WE'RE 
STRIKING OUT THE LANGUAGE, WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE. 
THE COURT: OKAY. AND COUNT 1 OF CASE 951900481 
WILL READ, POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITHIN ONE 
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THOUSAND FEET OF A CHURCH. IS THAT --
MS. SJOGREN: YES, YOUR HONOR. APPARENTLY THERE'S 
ADDITIONAL (UNINTELLIGIBLE) WE COULD PUT BACK THE MARIJUANA 
CHARGE WITH INTENT. SHE'S AGREED TO THREE SECOND DEGREE 
FELONIES, THAT'S THE PROBLEM. I DON'T -- I'M TRYING TO DO IT 
SO THAT IT FITS HER DESIRES, BUT IF WE CAN'T COME TO AN 
AGREEMENT, THEN I DON'T KNOW WHAT WE'RE GOING TO DO. 
MR. LAKER: IT'S THREE SECOND DEGREE FELONIES, BUT 
I'VE DONE IT THIS WAY SO THAT WE CAN GET IT WITHOUT ANY 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE) BUT IT WAS --IT WAS ALWAYS THREE 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
THE COURT: COURT WILL TAKE A BRIEF RECESS. 
(WHEREUPON THE COURT TOOK A RECESS.) 
THE CLERK: RECALL MATTERS OF STATE OF UTAH VERSUS 
SANDRA WALKER, CASES NUMBER 9519480 AND 481 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
MS. SJOGREN: OKAY. SO THAT I MAKE SURE WE HAVE THIS 
CORRECT, YOUR HONOR, ON THE NEW CASE ON WHICH MISS WALKER HAS 
NOT BEEN ARRAIGNED, THE PLAINTIFF IS DISMISSING THAT CASE IN 
EXCHANGE FOR HER PLEA TO THREE SECOND DEGREE FELONIES. IN 
CASE NUMBER 480, SHE WILL BE PLEADING TO COUNT 1, AMENDED TO 
POSSESSION OF COCAINE WITHIN A THOUSAND FEET OF A CHURCH A 
SECOND DEGREE FELONY. AND TO COUNT 2, POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA 
WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY. IN CASE 
NUMBER 481, SHE'LL BE PLEADING GUILTY TO AMENDED COUNT 1, 
15 
POSSESSED THAT WITHIN ONE THOUSAND FEET OF A CHURCH. DO YOU 
UNDERSTAND THOSE AS BEING THE ELEMENTS IN THAT CASE 95100713? 
DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT? 
MS. WALKER: YES. 
THE COURT: YOU WOULD ALSO NEED TO UNDERSTAND THAT 
THE ELEMENTS IN THE OTHER CASE THEY WOULD NEED TO PROVE WOULD 
BE THAT ON THE 2ND DAY OF MARCH 1995, THAT YOU POSSESSED 
COCAINE WITHIN ONE THOUSAND FEET OF A CHURCH. DO YOU 
UNDERSTAND THAT AS BEING THE ELEMENTS IN THAT CASE? 
MS. WALKER: YES. 
THE COURT: AND IN COUNT 2, THEY WOULD HAVE TO PROVE 
THAT ON OR ABOUT THE 2ND DAY OF MARCH 1995, THAT YOU POSSESSED 
MARIJUANA WITH THE INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE THAT AND THAT WAS 
WITHIN ONE THOUSAND FEET OF A CHURCH. DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT 
AS -- THOSE AS BEING THE ELEMENTS TO THIS -- THESE CHARGES? 
MS. WALKER: YES, SIR. 
THE COURT: OKAY. NOW, ARE YOU PLEADING GUILTY TO 
THE ELEMENTS BECAUSE YOU FEEL YOU ARE GUILTY OF THEM? IS THAT 
CORRECT? 
MS. WALKER: NO. 
THE COURT: OKAY. EXPLAIN THAT TO ME. 
MR. LAKER: EXPLAIN THAT, YOUR HONOR, UNDER — SHE'S 
ENTERING THESE PLEAS UNDER ALVORD TO AVOID THE EXPOSURE TO THE 
HIGHER FIRST DEGREES. 
THE COURT: THAT'S WHAT YOU'RE DOING. 
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THE COURT: THANK YOU. THAT IS THE FACTUAL BASIS, 
MISS WALKER? 
MS. WALKER: YES, SIR. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. THE COURT WOULD FIND THAT 
THOSE FACTS WOULD SUPPORT A PLEA OF GUILTY TO THE CHARGES THAT 
HAVE BEEN OUTLINED HERE THIS MORNING. NOW, MISS WALKER, I'VE 
EXPLAINED TO YOU RIGHTS. YOU'VE INDICATED TO ME THAT YOU 
UNDERSTAND THOSE RIGHTS. HAVING THOSE RIGHTS IN MIND, IS IT 
STILL YOUR DESIRE TO ENTER A PLEA OF GUILTY THIS MORNING? 
MS. WALKER: YES, SIR. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. THEN TO THE CHARGE OF A 
SECOND DEGREE FELONY, POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, 
WITHIN ONE THOUSAND FEET OF A CHURCH, HOW DO YOU PLEAD? 
MS. WALKER: GUILTY. 
MR. LAKER: IT'S ON THE 2 0TH OF DECEMBER. 
THE COURT: THAT ONE IS ON THE 2ND OF MARCH '95. 
AND TO COUNT 2, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, POSSESSION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, WITHIN ONE 
THOUSAND FEET OF A CHURCH, MARIJUANA, TO THAT CHARGE, HOW DO 
YOU PLEAD? 
MS. WALKER: GUILTY. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. COURT WILL ACCEPT THE PLEA 
OF GUILTY IN THAT CASE. AND NOW WE'RE ON CASE NUMBER 
951000713, TO THE SECOND DEGREE FELONY, POSSESSION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, COCAINE, WITHIN ONE THOUSAND FEET OF A 
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CHURCH, HOW DO YOU PLEAD? 
MS. WALKER: GUILTY. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. THE COURT WILL ACCEPT THE 
PLEA OF GUILTY IN EACH OF THESE CASES, AND FIND THAT YOU'VE 
MADE IT KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY. I WOULD ADVISE YOU THAT 
YOU -- WITHIN 3 0 DAYS YOU COULD MAKE A MOTION TO WITHDRAW YOUR 
PLEA. AT THIS POINT I'M NOT TELLING YOU THAT THE COURT WOULD 
GRANT THAT MOTION, BUT AFTER 3 0 DAYS, YOU FORFEIT THAT RIGHT. 
YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO BE SENTENCED IN NOT LESS THAN TWO NOR MORE 
THAN 45 DAYS. COURT IS REFERRING THIS MATTER TO THE ADULT 
PROBATION AND PAROLE DEPARTMENT TO GET A PRESENTENCE REPORT. 
I WANT YOU TO GO OVER THERE IMMEDIATELY RIGHT NOW FOR PURPOSES 
OF GETTING THIS PRESENTENCE. MISS SJOGREN, DO YOU HAVE A 
MOTION? 
MS. SJOGREN: YES, YOUR HONOR. ON CASE NUMBER 480, 
THAT'S THE DECEMBER 20TH DATE, THE STATE MOVES TO DISMISS 
COUNT 2. THE STATE MOVES TO DISMISS THE CASE WHICH I ONLY 
HAVE A CIRCUIT COURT NUMBER FOR, 951002588-FS, DISMISSING THAT 
CASE ENTIRELY. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. THAT MOTION IS GRANTED. 
FIRST COUNT --OR THE COUNT GIVEN AND THE CASE IS DISMISSED. 
THE CLERK: SENTENCING WILL BE AUGUST 31ST, 9:30. 
THE COURT: AUGUST 31ST AT 9:30. IS THAT DATE 
AGREEABLE? 
MS. SJOGREN: FINE WITH THE STATE, YOUR HONOR. 
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ABOUT TO ASK YOU IS NOT A DEPARTURE FROM WHAT IT SHOWS. 
PROBATION SEEMS TO SUGGEST THAT, WELL, THERE ARE BOTH 
AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES HERE. ALTHOUGH ON MY 
THING, THEY DON'T ACTUALLY PUT THEIR SPECIFIC REASON FOR 
DEPARTURE FROM A PRISON SENTENCE. 
I WOULD LIKE YOU TO -- I THINK SHE NEEDS TO GO INTO AN 
IN-PATIENT DRUG PROGRAM. A LONG TERM ONE. EVERYBODY THAT'S 
ASSOCIATED WITH HER DOES. PEOPLE AT MENTAL HEALTH, HER OWN 
DAUGHTER. AND THAT'S WHERE SHE OUGHT TO GO ON THIS KIND OF A 
CASE. SHE HAS BEEN, YOU KNOW, ARREST FREE FOR A PERIOD OF 11 
YEARS. I THINK WHILE SHE HAD A PROBLEM BEFORE AND CERTAINLY 
STANDS IN GOOD STEAD THAT SHE'S NOT BEEN IN TROUBLE. AND 
APPARENTLY THAT REALLY WASN'T LOOKED AT HERE, AND SO I WOULD 
ASK THAT THE COURT DELAY SENTENCING AND SEE IF WE CAN'T GET 
HER INTO EITHER THE A.T.U. DOWN IN DAVIS COUNTY AND DO AN 
ODYSSEY HOUSE TYPE PROGRAM OR SOMETHING LIKE THAT WHERE WE GET 
HER INTO AN IN-PATIENT THING. AND I THINK THAT WOULD MAKE A 
LOT MORE SENSE THAN JUST SIMPLY A PRISON COMMITMENT AT THIS 
POINT IN HER LIFE. AND THAT'S WHAT I'M ASKING THE COURT TO 
CONSIDER. 
THE COURT: STATE WANT TO BE HEARD? 
MS. SJOGREN: YOUR HONOR, I'M LOOKING FOR NOTES IN MY 
FILE, AND I -- IT SEEMS TO ME LIKE I RECALL THAT WE MAY HAVE 
AGREE TO REMAIN SILENT ON SENTENCING ON THIS. 
MR. CAINE: THAT'S THE PLEA BARGAIN, YES. 
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THE COURT: 14TH OF SEPTEMBER. COME BACK WITH SOME 
ALTERNATIVES. I'LL CONTINUE SENTENCING UNTIL THE 14TH OP 
SEPTEMBER. 
MR. CAINE: I'LL DO THAT. THANK YOU. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. CAINE: I WANT YOU TO COME OVER TO MY OFFICE SO 
WE CAN GO OVER THOSE. OKAY? ALL RIGHT. IN A COUPLE DAYS. 
OKAY? 
***** 
OGDEN, UTAH SEPTEMBER 14, 1995 
MR. LAKER: I HAVE A MATTER I THINK CAN BE HANDLED 
FAIRLY SUMMARILY. IT'S SANDRA WALKER. 
THE CLERK: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) STATE OF UTAH VERSUS 
SANDRA WALKER, CASE 9519480 AND 9519481. 
MR. LAKER: YOUR HONOR, THIS WAS ON FOR SENTENCING 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE) THIS WAS MY CASE. COURT KNOWS THAT I WAS OUT 
OF TOWN FOR AWHILE. I FIND OUT TODAY THAT (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
ALTERNATIVE PRISON PROGRAM. SIMPLY THAT HASN'T BEEN DONE YET. 
I WOULD ASK THE COURT TO ALLOW IT TO BEGIN (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
I'LL FOLLOW UP WITH IT. (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
THE COURT: OKAY. I'LL DO IT ON THE 28TH. 9:30. 
***** 
OGDEN, UTAH SEPTEMBER 28. 1995 
MR. MILES: YOUR HONOR, WE CAN ALSO CALL THE SANDRA 
WALKER MATTER. 
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PROBLEM. AND I HATE TO SEE THE COURT LOSE JURISDICTION 
BECAUSE I THINK THAT (UNINTELLIGIBLE) COURT COULD STRUCTURE A 
SENTENCE SUCH THAT SHE WENT INTO THE PROGRAM IMMEDIATELY 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE) WITHOUT LOSING JURISDICTION. 
THE COURT: CAN I PUT HER IN A PROGRAM IMMEDIATELY, 
THOUGH? HOW DO I DO THAT, MR. LAKER? THAT'S THE -- THAT'S 
THE QUESTION. 
MR. LAKER: WELL, THE COURT --
THE COURT: I MEAN I CAN'T ORDER HER INTO ODYESSY 
WITHOUT ODYESSY HAVING A BED AVAILABLE. 
MR. LAKER: I UNDERSTAND THAT, BUT -- BUT FOR 
EXAMPLE, YOU COULD -- YOU COULD SEND HER INTO THE A.R.C. AND 
HAVE HER REPORT AT SUCH --AT SUCH TIME AS THE ADULT PROBATION 
AND PAROLE -- THROUGH ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE AT SUCH TIME 
THAT A BED BECAME AVAILABLE, THEY COULD HAVE HER ENTRY 
IMMEDIATELY THERE. IF THEY NEED TO BE THROUGH -- THROUGH 
INCARCERATION THEN -- THEN THROUGH ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE) SHE WOULD BE REPORT IMMEDIATELY TO JAIL, AND 
THEN BE TRANSFERRED IMMEDIATELY OUT OF THE PROGRAM. 
THE COURT: DOES THE STATE WANT TO BE HEARD? 
MR. SAUNDERS: YES, YOUR HONOR. OUR POSITION IS, WE'VE 
ALWAYS FELT LIKE THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PRISON IS APPROPRIATE 
IN THIS CASE AND FOR THE VARIOUS REASONS. SHE'S ALWAYS 
MAINTAINED THAT SHE JUST HAS A USE PROBLEM. NOW WE THINK THE 
EVIDENCE WOULD -- IS IN CLEAR DISPUTE WITH THAT IN THIS CASE. 
31 
THE STATE HAD EVIDENCE OF VARIOUS BUYS TO THIS HOME. WHEN 
THEY WENT TO THE HOME, THE OFFICERS WENT IN, THE DOOR WAS 
BARRED. THEY HAD TO KICK IT IN. AT THE TIME THAT THEY WENT 
IN, SHE WAS IN THE PROCESS OF COOKING MORE COCAINE AT THE TIME 
THAT THEY WENT IN. HER -- I GUESS THIS WAS METHAMPHETAMINE. 
YOUR HONOR, THIS WAS A DRUG HOUSE. PEOPLE WERE GOING 
THERE AND BUYING AND USING DRUGS. WE FEEL LIKE THIS IS A 
SERIOUS PROBLEM. WE DON'T FEEL LIKE SHE JUST HAS A USE 
PROBLEM. AND FOR THOSE REASONS, WE FELT LIKE THE 
RECOMMENDATION FOR PRISON IS APPROPRIATE, AND WE DON'T FEEL 
LIKE JUST PUTTING HER IN A PROGRAM IS GOING FAR ENOUGH IN THIS 
CASE. 
MS. WALKER: YOUR HONOR, AS FAR AS MY PLEA BARGAIN, 
THE REASON THA I SIGNED IT IS THAT THE STATE WOULD MAKE NO 
RECOMMENDATION ONE WAY OR THE OTHER ON SENTENCING. THAT WAS 
JUST VIOLATED. 
MR. LAKER: I THINK THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. 
MS. WALKER: I KNOW IT'S CORRECT. THAT WAS PART OF 
MY PLEA BARGAIN. 
MR. SAUNDERS: LET ME LOOK FOR A NOTE, YOUR HONOR. 
THERE WASN'T ONE IN MY FILE. MAYBE THERE IS ONE IN MS. 
SJOGREN'S FILE. 
MR. LAKER: THE COURT HAS THE EXPIATION AGREEMENT --
MR. SAUNDERS: I DON'T HAVE ANY NOTES IN EITHER FILE, 
YOUR HONOR. IF THAT'S ON THE EXPIATION AGREEMENT, I REQUEST 
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TO SEE THAT. 
THE COURT: WOULD THAT BE SOMETHING THAT WOULD BE 
HANDWRITTEN? 
MR. LAKER: YES, YOUR HONOR. MAY I (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
MIGHT BE ABLE TO FIND IT. (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
THE COURT: MR. LAKER, I APPRECIATE YOU BEING HERE. 
THIS MATTER HAS BEEN CONTINUED TO -- FOR YOU IN PARTICULAR, 
AND IT'S OBVIOUS TO ME THAT YOU'VE DONE EVERYTHING THAT WAS 
REQUESTED AND REQUIRED OF THE COURT ON YOUR BEHALF. 
THE COURT IS IMPOSING THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE: I'M 
SENTENCING YOU, MISS WALKER, TO SPEND ONE TO 15 YEARS IN THE 
UTAH STATE PRISON ON THE EACH OF THESE MATTERS. THEY'RE TO 
RUN CONCURRENT. I'M PLACING YOU IN THE CUSTODY OF THE WEBER 
COUNTY SHERIFF. I HOPE, MISS WALKER, THAT SOME WAY THAT THE 
DRUGS ARE OUT OF YOUR LIFE AND YOU KEEP THEM OUT OF YOUR LIFE. 
THAT'S ALL. 
***** 
